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ABSTRACT 
A range of studies has found that corruption has a significant impact upon FDI decisions, 
however to date there has been scant investigation into longer term investments made by 
firms and their relative proclivity to reinvest. Further, there is particularly little work on 
reinvestment choices made on the transitional periphery of post-state socialist countries and 
how these might differ from the more stable transitional economies of central and Eastern 
Europe. Utilising 2005 World Bank Enterprise Survey data, this study explores the 
relationship between corruption and MNEs’ strategic decision to reinvest profits. From an 
institutionalist starting point, we find variation in the impact of different dimensions of 
corruption upon reinvestment; pervasive corruption impacts negatively upon reinvestment, 
but its effects are more pronounced in the transitional periphery. Perceived robust legal 
institutions have a positive correlation with reinvestment, but again, the negative effects are 
most pronounced on the transitional peripheral state socialist states. We ascribe this disparity 
to greater institutional fluidity, and explore why this context has particularly adverse effects. 
Finally, we find that firm level attributes of larger size and greater age play an important role 
in positive reinvestment decisions, appearing to mitigate the worst consequences of this 
fluidity. 
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Context, law and reinvestment decisions: Why the transitional 
periphery differs from other post-state socialist economies 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study explores the relationship between the institutional environment and firm growth, 
and more particularly, the impact of corruption upon reinvestment decisions by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) on the transitional periphery. More specifically, we explore whether 
reinvestment is lower on the transitional periphery than in other post-state socialist countries 
and the reasons for this. The former is defined, for the purposes of this article, as those post-
state socialist countries characterized by particularly weak or fluid institutions, and where 
either EU accession is not on the agenda, or it is a remote, or difficult, prospect. This 
encompasses the peripheral states of the Balkans, and the Post-Soviet republics of the 
Caucasus, and Central Asia. On the one hand, being a former Soviet republic is clearly not a 
barrier to Europeanisation, as borne out by the Baltic States. On the other hand, there is little 
doubt that the historical experience of former Yugoslavia is very different from that of the 
former Soviet Union. Although such transitional peripheral countries are clearly very different 
from those more developed post-state socialist countries that have already entered the EU, it 
could be argued that the peripheral Balkan States (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosova) 
all share similarities with the republics of Central Asia on the Caucasus in terms of both past 
legacies and concomitant possible future trajectories. Hence, we further compare these two 
categories with each other in looking at reinvestment trends.    
 
To date, very little work has been carried out exploring longer term reinvestment decisions 
and the impact corruption might have upon these in the transitional perpihery. It can be 
argued that, on account of ambitious experiments in institutional building and redesign 
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following the collapse of the Soviet Union and state socialism more generally, these settings 
are more fluid institutional environments than many African nations which, although 
characterised by weak institutions, also show long historical continuities (Collins, 
Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009; Herbst, 2000). This study explores whether the transitional 
peripheral countries have distinct characteristics in terms of reinvestment choices, and 
whether the negative consequences of corruption and weak rule of the law are more 
pronounced in contexts where institutional arrangements are more fluid. Existing research to 
date on the relationship between investment and environmental uncertainty, especially with 
respect to the key dimension of corruption, is varied but often disparate (Demirbag, 
McGuinness & Altay, 2010). However, in this discussion of the relationship between 
reinvestment and different types of corruption is remarkably absent. What effect might 
corruption have upon the reinvestment decision? This is a significant research gap which 
warrants addressing and consequently, this paper seeks both to make a contribution to a 
nascent literature and, to point a way forward for future investigation.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
  
Institutions and the Transitional Periphery 
The literature on institutions is extensive, but there is broad agreement that institutions are 
central in determining how secure is an organisation’s prosperity (North, 1981:17). Weak 
institutions can lead to a decrease in corporate transparency and asymmetry of information 
which can impede capital allocation and investment efficiency (Durnev, Errunza, & 
Molchanov, 2010). The late 1990s and early 2000s literature on institutions and firm 
outcomes has tended to focus on mature economies and/or assume institutional arrangements 
have been established over a considerable period of time (Dore, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
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La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999, 2002). Rational-hierarchical approaches to 
institutions see their most important consequences in terms of protecting private property 
rights by providing incentives, or disincentives. (La Porta, Lopez, & Shleifer, 2008; G. T. 
Wood, 2011; La Porta, Lopez, & Shleifer, 2008; Wood, 2011). Within the rational 
hierarchical camp, the work of La Porta and colleagues has been most influential; they see 
property rights as flowing from a single institutional feature, the law, and the origin of legal 
arrangements. This approach is not without its problems, in that it discounts the beneficial 
impact of social ties and social compromises (Hall & Soskice, 2001). At the same time, it has 
been highly influential, informing the World Bank Doing Business Guides, which, in turn, is 
likely to have impacted investor decisions (D. Wood, 2011). Hence, a key focus of the study 
is the consequences of legal institutions. 
 
However, as Wood and Lane (2012) note, institutional arrangements are not only subject to 
change, but also vary in their relative fluidity in time and place,. Whilst all institutional 
arrangements only exist through being constantly reconstituted – and adjusted - through the 
choices of social actors, this process varies in its intensity according to context (Giddens 
1984). Institutional fluidity is defined as a particularly intensive variation of institutional 
arrangement. In other words, whilst specific rules, conventions and embedded patterns of 
behaviour may exist, in times of institutional fluidity they are more likely to be contested and 
radically redefined. It is also easier for players to fully, or partially, disengage from the 
system where institutions are weak or fluid (Lane & Wood, 2012). As historical 
institutionalists note, any social compromises are specific to a particular time period, with 
compromises inevitably arising in response to severe societal crisis or trauma. Although they 
may become embedded, simply through a lack of known alternatives or because alternative 
arrangements do not seem feasible, they will ultimately be open to contestation and 
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redefinition (see Thelen 2010). As a result, whilst societies may experience long-term 
historical continuities, such continuities are neither indefinite nor immutable.  
 
This begs the question, how do the countries under review differ from other emerging 
markets, such as those, for example, in Africa and Asia? Many other emerging markets had 
institutional arrangements established during the colonial era resulting in long-term legacies 
(see Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2012; Herbst, 2000). What sets the transitional 
periphery apart is not simply institutional weakness, but also, it can be argued, greater 
fluidity. Unlike the case of colonial Africa, the departing Soviet rulers (in the case of the Post-
Soviet republics) devoted little attention to the institutional legacies left on their departure, 
resulting in widely divergent institution building experiments. Indeed, it has been argued that 
the abiding institutional legacies in such countries – the nature of corporate law - predates the 
Soviet era, and to some extent these have displaced Soviet legal institutions (La Porta, et al., 
2008). In the Balkans, there was also variety in the nature of the transitions from, the external 
protectorate model initially deployed in Bosnia-Herzgovina and Kosovo to, the disorganised 
and chaotic transition of Albania. What difference does institutional fluidity make? While, for 
example, it could be argued that Francophone West Africa is characterised by weak property 
rights (Herbst, 2000; La Porta, et al., 1999), at least investors can have a degree of confidence 
in basic legal continuities, even at times of constitutional irregularity or military rule. In 
contrast, across the transitional periphery, rule books have been rewritten, and, within many 
contexts, are likely to be rewritten again, at least in the medium term (Collins, 2009). In the 
case of the Central Asian republics, this involved not just economic and political 
liberalization, but also nation building, rather than the regaining of national independence. 
Collins (2009) argues that clan politics is a key characteristic of Central Asian states which 
emerged in the late Soviet era. This made liberalisation not only difficult, but extremely so. 
Gullette (2010) argues that the extreme nature of the economic transformation resulted in 
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people falling back on personal networks and relations in order to manage the impacts of fluid 
institutional environments. Consequently, extended family based ties have interpenetrated the 
polity, making for ongoing struggles over state resources. Auty (2006) suggests that in both 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, economic challenges and political institution construction 
have gone hand-in-hand with elite continuity, with institutions being remolded to suit elite 
interests. In a similar vein Thornberry et al (2014) discuss how important a role the informal 
networks of bazaaries (local merchants) and ulama (religious scholars) played in influencing 
the Iranian political institutional environment. Finally, it could be argued that the transitional 
peripheral Balkan economies of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina have, again, faced the dual 
problems of chronic elite failure and resilience, with nation building become disarticulated 
from the confrontation of structural political problems (see Chandler, 2006). 
 
In the context of institutional fluidity, firms may be more likely to feel compelled to seek ad 
hoc arrangements with political elites. As a consequence, they may be daunted by the greater 
risks of high corruption or, see it as a normal part of doing business in countries where there 
are rich natural resource endowments or strategic market possibilities.  
 
 
Reinvestment Choices 
Reinvestment is key to the firm’s success, indeed to its very survival. Reinvestment has been 
described variously as the decision to expand existing business (McCarthy et al., 1993) and 
the percentage of profit invested into company (Cull & Xu, 2005). Variables which have been 
identified as relevant to enhancing organisational longevity include factors for which 
reinvestment can be key, such as the scale of operation (Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007; Li, 
1995), growth strategies (Mata & Portugal, 2002) and resource utilisation (Bercovitz & 
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Mitchell, 2007; Bradley, Aldrich, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2011). Size is well established in the 
literature as a critical factor in firm survival (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Bercovitz & Mitchell, 
2007; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010; Demirbag, Tatoglu and Apaydin, 2012; Mitchell, 
1994; Sarkar, Echambadi, Agarwal, & Sen, 2006). 
Writing from an international business standpoint, Wren & Jones (2009) found that foreign-
owned plants had higher exit rates but that reinvestment increased the life-time of start-up 
plants while Mudambi (1998) found that MNEs with longer tenure were more likely to 
reinvest. It is worth noting that, whilst neither authors adopted an institutional perspective, 
both studies were conducted in England, a developed economy with strong institutions,. 
Institutional factors have been acknowledged as significant for reinvestment decisions (Cull 
& Xu, 2005; Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002) as well as repatriation of earnings 
(Lundan, 2006). Although Cull & Xu (2005) found that contract enforcement did impact upon 
reinvestment, they did not explore this within additional dimensions of corruption. However, 
there are some indications that the importance of secure property rights may vary according to 
firm size. One cross-country analysis of small business reinvestment in emerging economies 
showed that access to external finance proved more significant in small firms’ reinvestment 
decisions than the security of property rights (Chakravarty & Xiang, 2011;  Piwakowski and 
Trojanski 2014). In terms of survival and exit (divestment) strategies, the picture is equally 
varied (Chung & Beamish, 2005; Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003; 
Hallward-Driemeier, 2009; Lu & Xu, 2006; Mata & Portugal, 2002). So, for example, 
Hallward-Driemier (2009) argued that in countries with higher bribes and higher corruption, 
exit rates are higher; on the other hand where legal rights are weak, financial services less 
developed and competition is muted, exit rates are lower. 
 
Corruption and Investment 
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Some commentators have argued that corruption may be beneficial in environments which 
have been distorted through ill-functioning institutions. In effect, corruption confers benefits 
to business through ‘greasing the wheels’ and lowering transaction costs (Huntington, 1968; 
Leff, 1964; Meon & Sekkat, 2005). Others argue that corruption is itself distortionary. It 
increases perceived levels of environmental uncertainty (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Wei, 
1997); it ‘sands the wheels’. In highly fluid institutional settings, this is arguably more likely, 
making the unpredictable even more so. However, this arises not simply from the presence of 
corruption per se, but to how corruption manifests (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). The contribution 
of corruption to perceived levels of environmental uncertainty is underpinned by a number of 
factors, of which pervasiveness – corruption that is certain and widespread, and arbitrariness – 
corruption that is uncertain, are key dimensions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Lee & Oh, 2007; 
Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006; Wei, 
1997). The pervasiveness of corruption is seen as more of a deterrent to the initial investment 
decision because it increases the known costs of investing. In contrast, when corruption is 
unknown or unpredictable, in other words, arbitrary, it does not act as such a deterrent to 
investment because it is perceived as part of the uncertainty of operating a new market 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).  
 
Our study follows previous studies, in distinguishing between the two dimensions 
underpinning government corruption, namely, arbitrariness and pervasiveness (Lee & Oh, 
2007; Meschi, 2009; Rodriguez, et al., 2005). We disaggregate the impact of government 
corruption on the reinvestment decision by focusing upon the influence of both pervasive and 
arbitrary corruption in the institutional context of the transitional periphery. 
 
*************** INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE******************* 
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Corruption and Reinvestment 
In making strategic decisions about reinvestment, incumbent MNEs have additional 
knowledge of the institutional environment gained through their operating experience post 
entry. This is particularly important with respect to pervasiveness as it means that the level of 
uncertainty regarding this dimension has decreased and, therefore, managers are less likely to 
misjudge or ignore the costs (Doh, et al., 2003). Consequently, their knowledge in coping 
with pervasive levels of corruption is likely to be well developed. In effect, their market 
experience has mitigated their liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) with respect to 
corruption. Either they know with which third parties they need to negotiate, and in what 
manner or, they are apprised of the potential consequences of non-engagement with these 
third parties. The former may derive from an isomorphic process over time, encompassing 
coercive and mimetic elements (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whilst the latter may relate to a 
specific ethical stance (Bondy and Starkey 2014), supra-national conventions or country of 
origin legal constraints (e.g. the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, OECD 
Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business, 1997 and 2009, 
UK Bribery Act 2010). However, the institutional embeddedness of the firm may offer less 
benefit to the organisation where corruption is characterised by arbitrariness. By arbitrariness 
we mean the degree of uncertainty and capriciousness associated with public sector corruption 
(Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006:403). For example, there is evidence to suggest that firms which 
interact more extensively with public sector institutions and are subject to a higher 
bureaucracy burden and more inspections, are likely to bribe more (Nur-Tegin & Sahin, 
2013). However, where bureaucrats co-ordinate and organise their activities, bribery levels 
are lower (Blackburn & Forgues-Puccio, 2009). This finding supports the ‘grabbing hand’ 
perspective which emphasises the negative impact arising from the unpredictability associated 
with independent bureaucrats soliciting bribes in pursuit of their own agendas (Frye & 
Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Nonetheless, there is significant difference in the 
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impact of corruption upon firms investing in transitional economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
In making the initial FDI decision in this context, there is evidence to suggest that firms prefer 
to deal with the uncertainty around arbitrary corruption rather than the more predictable 
pervasive corruption. Managers view arbitrary corruption as one part of the endemic 
uncertainty that underpins the institutional structures supporting business transactions in 
transitional economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008:13). Although, pervasive corruption also has a 
negative influence, it represents a known, additional and, ongoing, cost. In transitional 
economies, the additional unpredictable transaction costs which corruption represents “may 
be compensated by the benefits that it provides in terms of bypassing regulations and 
institutions that were designed for a previous system but have not yet been dismantled” 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008:15). We follow the author’s argument about the contingent nature of 
the impact of corruption, and extend this underlying institutional rationale in the reinvestment 
decision. We argue that in countries where institutional arrangements are particularly fluid, 
the negative consequences of corruption will be more pronounced. Hence, such countries will 
constitute less attractive reinvestment destinations than the “core” transitional economies of 
Eastern and Central Europe which have attained EU membership.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater perceived arbitrary corruption is negatively related to reinvestment by 
the MNE subsidiaries.  
 
Bribery is one significant aspect of corruption (Lee, Oh and Eden, 2010) and, where 
commonplace and endemic, it is a key indicator of pervasive corruption. The soliciting, and 
payment, of bribes illustrates the weakness of institutions which, in turn, can lead also to the 
inadequate enforcement of legal contracts. Pervasiveness of corruption has been defined as 
the likelihood of the average firm encountering corruption in its normal interactions with state 
officials (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Uhlenbruck et al, 2006). These corrupt 
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interactions are generally manifest by implicit and/or explicit demands for payments or 
bribes.  
 
Laws against bribery abroad, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (2009) or the more 
recent 2010 Bribery Act in the UK, aim to reduce the supply of bribes by foreign investors by 
increasing the costs of bribing abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). In other words, anti-bribery 
laws act as a disincentive to engaging in corruption in host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
In his study, whilst Hines (1995) did not find an overall negative correlation between 
corruption and inward FDI, he did find that American business activities in bribe-prone 
countries decreased sharply after the enactment of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(1977). However, Spencer & Gomez (2010) reported more mixed results with respect to 
MNEs from home countries which were signatories to the OECD Convention. Having said 
that, there is evidence that an MNE’s readiness to pay bribes is lowest when such illicit 
activities are not tolerated in its home country (Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan, & Bixby, 2010). 
Even if firms continue to transact business in countries riven with bribery, but do not engage 
in such practices, they are likely to find themselves disadvantaged in comparison to 
competitors who do pay bribes. In the longer term, should companies engage in bribery, they 
may find themselves subject to other direct and indirect costs. Illustrating the potential 
significance of such costs is the case of the defence contractor BAE which was reported to 
have agreed to pay out $450m to US authorities in penalties over alleged corporate bribery as 
well as £30m in UK fines (Peel, 2010; Peel & Kirchgaessner, 2010) and that of UK based 
publisher Macmillan which was debarred from any World Bank financed contracts for a 
period of six years after admitting bribery payments relating to a Trust Fund-supported 
education project in Southern Sudan (World Bank, 2010).    
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It could be argued that these cases represent exceptions to a general rule, and there are many 
instances where firms have engaged in corrupt behaviour with relative impunity, an example 
being BAE’s role in a major Saudi arms deal. However, on a day to day level, firms that pay 
more in bribes are likely to spend more time negotiating regulations with foreign countries’ 
officials (Kaufmann & Wei, 2000); another layer of cost. In contexts where corruption is 
pervasive, competing factions and different levels of official may each express their own 
demands for making the same transaction possible; in such circumstances a “rational corrupt 
agent may (readily) extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit” (Bliss 
& Tella, 1997:1001). So, firms operating in countries with high levels of bribery are likely to 
find their costs are increased irrespective of whether or not they actually pay bribes, and these 
costs can extend beyond the short term.  
 
H2:  Greater perceived pervasive corruption is negatively related to reinvestment by the MNE 
subsidiaries.  
 
Juridical Institutions and Reinvestment 
Quality of government (Holmberg, Rothstein, & Nasiritousi, 2009) and specifically ‘good 
governance within each country’ is vital in aiding development and fostering economic 
growth (United Nations, 2000:13). Given that institutions provide the context within which 
the firm’s transactions take place, it is to be expected that a number of scholars have noted the 
importance of positive and robust host government institutions (Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001). 
Within the economics and finance literature, priority is accorded to private property rights (La 
Porta, et al., 1999, 2002). Mirroring this, the ‘Rule of law’ constitutes one of the World 
Bank’s six Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kray, & Mastruzzi, 2007). 
Confidence in the ability to capture rents is inherently linked with managerial perceptions of 
the host country’s legal institutions to provide adequate safeguards against arbitrary rulings as 
12 
 
well as shaping an environment in which wrongdoers are captured and punished (Roy & 
Oliver, 2009). ‘Administrative quality’ in the form of control of corruption as well as the 
investment-friendly profile of administration, law and order is an important influence in 
decisions about resource commitment (Aysan, Nabli, & Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007), with 
strong legal institutions  critical in securing property rights and integrity of contract (Haggard, 
MacIntyre, & Tiede, 2008).  
 
Arguably, firms are unlikely to commit further resources in markets, even low-risk internally 
generated finance, where they property rights are not respected and contracts are 
unenforceable. Reinvestment is likely to take place within an environment in which the firm 
is confident that this financial commitment can be protected by legal recourse, if necessary. 
The judicial system provides “coercive enforcement” of agreements (North, 1990:362) and 
therefore the efficiency of the judicial system is critically important (Mauro, 1995), and drive 
re-investment choices. As the World Bank Enterprise Survey data indicates (Mellahi, 
Demirbag and Wood, 2012), among transitional institutions, weak legal institutions are more 
likely to be encountered on the periphery, and this is the primary determinant of lower levels 
of reinvestment among transitional peripheral states.  
 
H3: Greater perceived quality of judicial institutions is positively related to reinvestment by 
the MNE subsidiaries.  
 
Reinvestment and Length of Operations 
MNEs with a longer tenure of operations within a particular context are more likely to make 
additional investments (Mudambi, 1998). Through longevity, the firm may develop 
experience-based capabilities, refined routines and the ability to adapt (Baum & Shipilov, 
2006; Henderson, 1999). Such skills are of even greater value in environments characterised 
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by high degrees of uncertainty within the institutional domain. Over time, organisations have 
the opportunity to build networks and relationships with institutions (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, 
& Wright, 2000) thereby reducing the negative impacts of corruption on transactions costs 
(Makhija, 2003; Makhija & Stewart, 2002). Age can confer specific advantage in terms of the 
institutional embeddedness of the organisation leading to a reduction in perceptions of  
institutional uncertainty resulting from corruption, or the opportunity to manipulate the 
environment to match its needs (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), so, for example, older firms may 
have developed greater bargaining power leading to public officials demanding fewer bribes 
(Svensson, 2003). At the most basic level, those older firms actively participating in 
corruption know who to pay and, how much. Similarly experienced firms, not actively 
engaging in corruption, understand the likely impacts and are therefore in the optimal position 
to make judgements regarding cost implications. Hence, whilst transitional peripheral 
economies are more challenging environments in which to do business than the core post state 
socialist economies, it could be argued that any differences in reinvestment choices between 
these two sets of countries will be less pronounced among firms that have been established for 
longer. 
 
H4a: The length of an MNE’s operation in a host country is positively related to its 
reinvestment in the same host country. 
H4b: Any differences in levels of reinvestment between transitional peripheral, and other post 
state socialist, economies will be less pronounced among firms that have been domiciled for 
longer. 
 
Reinvestment and Size of Operation 
Larger firms have greater resources available to them than smaller firms and therefore are 
better able to pay bribes (Svensson, 2003). Increased size also provides advantages such as 
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enhanced contacts, ‘clout’ and the ability to make credible threats of retaliation to host 
governments should property rights be violated (Acs, Morck, Shaver, & Yeung, 1997). The 
impact of corruption is greater for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) than for large 
MNEs (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005). Further, SMEs are more sensitive to the 
heightened uncertainty and levels of risk which are characteristic of corrupt institutional 
domains (Ghosal & Loungani, 2000; Lskavyan & Spatareanu, 2008) and consequently they 
are less likely to commit additional resources through reinvestment. Thus, it could be argued 
that any differences in reinvestment choices between core transitional and transitional 
peripheral economies will be less pronounced in the case of larger firms. 
 
H5a: The size of an MNE’s operation in a host country is positively related to its reinvestment 
in the same host country. 
H5b: Any differences in levels of reinvestment between transitional peripheral, and other post 
state socialist, economies will be less pronounced as firm size increases. 
 
It has been argued that, for firms operating in transitional economies, there is a trade-off 
between the advantages provided by corruption in navigating a reforming and weak 
institutional domain and concomitant uncertainty and additional transaction costs (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). Consequently, corruption does negatively influence the FDI decision, but the 
impact is less pronounced in transitional economies, in comparison to developed economies. 
However, innovating firms in developing markets pay more bribes (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-
Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2014). Examples of innovation include upgrading a product line, 
introducing new technology or signing new joint ventures – activities which require 
reinvestment by the firm. Such activities necessitate additional engagement with public 
officials thereby increasing the opportunity for the solicitation of further payments and bribes 
by government officials in an organised manner, typical of pervasive corruption. Moreover, 
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bribe payments have been found to be higher under more decentralized bureaucratic structures 
(Diaby & Sylwester, 2014). It is credible to argue such structures are more likely to be found 
in contexts where institutions are sufficiently weak, or fluid, to allow actors to disengage, 
fully or partially, from the centre (Wood & Lane, 2012). This in turn increases the potential 
for arbitrary corruption. Consequently, we argue that: 
 
H6a –Pervasive corruption has a larger negative impact on reinvestment decisions on 
transitional peripheral, than on other post state socialist, economies.  
H6b – Arbitrary corruption has a larger negative impact on reinvestment decisions on 
transitional peripheral, than on other post state socialist economies 
 
METHODS 
This study draws upon the World Bank Enterprise Survey Data and utilises a sample of 27 
countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, of which (more than 5%) belong to a foreign 
investor (www.enterprisesurveys.org/ ). The World Bank Enterprise Survey is designed to 
collect firm level data on a broad range of issues that firms face. The survey is based on a 
stratified random sampling which covers firms of different size, industry, ownership, country 
of origin, and geographical location (for more details see Table 1). The Enterprise Survey 
covers a wide range of global issues, many of those particularly relevant to transitional and 
emerging countries around the world. Issues covered in the survey include financing of 
SMEs, human resources, technology development, corruption, crime, and infrastructure and 
other issues relevant to business environment. (For a detailed explanation of the sampling 
method of the enterprise survey see, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/, Uhlenbruck and 
Rodrguez et al., 2006; Sahadev and Demirbag, 2011; Gomes, Sahadev, Glaister and 
Demirbag, 2014). 
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Transitional periphery countries constitute 53.7% of the sample and a breakdown is reported 
in Table 1. Transitional EU members in the sample are Hungary (9.3%), Poland (7.4%), , 
Estonia (4.0%), Czech Republic (3.3%), Slovakia (2.6%), Latvia (2.5%), Lithuania (2.5%) 
and other post soviet EU members (14.7%).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Missing values and outliers have been removed from the original data in order to render a 
clean dataset for analysis. Since the focus of this study is to examine factors affecting MNEs’ 
reinvestment in countries at the transitional periphery, all non MNE entries were also 
removed from the dataset.  
 
Measurement of variables 
Dependent and independent variables are measured as follows: 
Dependent variable (REINVEST): The log of re-investment is in US dollar by the firm. Re-
investment covers items such as new building, machinery and equipment. 
 
Independent variables 
Judicial institutions:  This is based on respondents’ perception of courts in countries where 
these subsidiaries are located, thus the state of the court system in a host country is used as 
proxy for legal institutions. Three different dimensions of legal institutions are treated as 
dichotomous variables. A value of 1 is ascribed to the state of a court system if it was 
perceived as being to a great extent fair and impartial (IMPARTIAL); 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
the court system is given the value of 1 if perceived as being to a great extent honest and 
uncorrupt (UNCORRUPT); 0 otherwise. Finally, the ability of court systems to enforce its 
decisions is the third dimension of legal institutions (ENFORCE) and it has the value of 1 if it 
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was perceived that the court system can enforce its decisions in resolving business disputes to 
a great extent; 0 otherwise. 
 
PERVASIVE, Pervasiveness of corruption is measured on a 6 point scale according to whether 
it was common for firms in its line of business to pay some irregular “additional 
payments/gifts” to get things done with regards to customs, taxes, licences, regulations, 
services etc.  
 
ARBITR (Arbitrariness): Arbitrariness of corruption in host countries is measured by 
respondents’ perception of government agents acting within rules without unofficial recourse 
to any financial or social gains. The variable aims to measure whether another official or 
superior intervenes, without unofficial recourse to financial or social gains, when government 
agents act against the rules. The perceived level of arbitrariness is measured by a 6 point 
reverse measurement where 6 is never and; 1 is always.  
 
AGE: Subsidiary age is measured by Logarithm of  years of subsidiary’s operations in a 
country. 
SIZE: Size is measured by Logarithm of number of permanent, full time firm employees.  
Regional impact 
TRANSPERI: Host countries MNE Subsidiaries’ are classified as a dummy variable where 1 
is Transitional Periphery; 0 is otherwise. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Parent level controls: 
18 
 
DC MNE: Country of origin of MNEs are classified as DC MNE is 1, if the country of origin 
was a developed country; 0 otherwise. 
EMNE: Country of origin of MNEs are classified as EMNE is 1, if the country of origin was 
an emerging country; 0 otherwise. 
 
Industry level controls 
The sample comprises 5 major sectors. These are:  
MANUFACT: Manufacturing 
TRADE: Wholesale and retail trade 
CONSTRUCT: Construction and real estate 
HOSPITALITY: Hotels and hospitality industry 
OTHER SERVICES: This is used as the base dummy. 
 
 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
We test hypotheses by linear regression analyses to determine the impact of hypothesised 
variables on log transformation of reinvestment by MNEs’ subsidiaries in respective host 
countries. Any multicollinearity problems were checked before running regression analysis. 
Table 2 shows the binary correlations between variables used in regression models. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 2.9 for all the variables included in the 
analysis, except for sector dummy. Both pairwise correlations and VIFs are at acceptable 
levels. This shows the lack of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2006). We use linear regression 
models to test hypothesized relations.  (Results from linear regression analyses are shown in 
Table 3 and 4. The F statistics indicate that all four models in Table 3 are significant. The 
results from a subgroup regression analysis were used to test hypotheses 4 and 5 (Table 4). 
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Table 4 shows that all three sets of models (Models 1 to 3) have high explanatory power with 
significant F values (57.76; 24.69; 38.49 at p<.001 respectively). As indicated in Table 4, all 
models have a good fit with adjusted R
2
 measures confirming explanatory power of models 
presented to examine impact of subsidiary age and size on reinvestment between firms 
investing in transitional periphery counties (classified as 1) and others (classified as 0). 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In order to test the study’s hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4a, 5a, 6a and 6b, four regression models are 
estimated with the dependent variable being MNEs’ re-investment (REINVEST). Hypotheses 
4b and 5b are tested by subgroup models for transitional periphery and post-Soviet EU 
economies with dependent variable being reinvestment. Results of subgroup regression 
analyses are presented in Table 4. A summary illustration of variables, hypothesised relations 
and directions of hypotheses are presented in figure 1. 
 
In the first model in Table 3 (Model 1), two sets of control variables and the regional variable 
(TRANSPERI) are introduced. Model 2 however, introduces independent variables judicial 
institutions related variables (IMPARTIAL, UNCORRUPT, and ENFORCE), and two 
dimensions of corruption (PERVASIVE and ARBITR). Interactions of corruption dimensions 
with transitional periphery are presented in Model 4 while the final model (Model 5) tests 
impact of corruption dimensions and judicial institutions on reinvestment decisions of MNEs. 
 
The first hypothesis receives very significant support both in Models 2 and 5 with a negative 
sign, indicating that when there exists arbitrary corruption, MNEs are less likely to reinvest in 
the respective host countries.  Hypothesis 2 (pervasiveness of corruption) however receive 
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statistically significant support only in the final model when the interaction with the 
transitional periphery is introduced.  
 
The results presented in Model 2 in Table 3 indicate that whilst arbitrariness of corruption has 
a negative effect, an honest and uncorrupted court system (UNCORRUPT) has a positive 
effect on the reinvestment decisions of MNEs. Therefore, the third hypothesis receives only 
partial support as the coefficient for only one dimension of judicial institutions is significant, 
but not for the others. While having an “honest and uncorrupted” court system has a positive 
and significant impact on reinvestment decisions, “fairness and impartiality” and “ability to 
enforce decisions” does not emerge as statistically significant. Taking all these three measures 
together, the relationship between re-investment and judicial institutions indicates that the 
there is a positive relationship between the quality of judicial environment and re-investment 
decision in a host country.  
 
What is surprising, however, is that the pervasiveness of corruption in host countries 
(Hypothesis 2) did not receive meaningful support in terms of its impact on the level of re-
investment. Although the coefficient has a negative sign, this is not a statistically significant 
one in Model 2. We further examine both arbitrariness and pervasiveness of corruption’s 
impact by analysing their interaction effect for transitional periphery. Although the level of 
pervasiveness of corruption does not emerge as significant in Model 2, the interaction effect 
for transitional periphery yields negative, and statistically significant, results. The interaction 
effect of transitional periphery with PERVASIVE and ARBITR increase their impact in the 
final model as negative and significant (in Model 5), indicating that pervasiveness and 
arbitrariness of corruption perception of executives in transitional periphery negatively affects 
re-investment decisions of MNEs in the transitional periphery (compared to EU member 
transitional countries). The coefficients of interactions of pervasiveness (PERVASIVE) and 
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arbitrariness (ARBITR) of corruption with transitional periphery are both negative and 
significant in the final model providing significant support to hypotheses 6a and 6b. While 
arbitrariness of corruption has a very strong negative impact on reinvestment at transitional 
periphery (β = -0.06 p<0.01), there is a relatively less significant impact of pervasiveness for 
transitional periphery countries (β = -0.05 p<0.10). 
 
Subsidiary size appears to be a significant factor in MNE re-investment decisions. Regression 
models presented in Table 3 indicate that the larger the size of a subsidiary, the greater the 
likelihood of a decision to re-invest in a host country. The impact of the length of operation 
(AGE) and the size of operation (SIZE) were tested in model 5 in Table 3. Both the length of 
operation and the size of MNE subsidiary are significant factors in determining the percentage 
reinvestment undertaken by MNEs. The regression coefficients associated with the AGE and 
SIZE are statistically significant (p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively) providing support for H4a 
and H5a.  
 
Hypotheses 4b and 5b are tested by a set of subgroup regression models presented in Table 4. 
Model 1 in Table 4 introduces a full model for reinvestment (REINVEST) as dependent, AGE 
and SIZE as independent with control variables, whilst in Models 2 and 3, two subgroup 
regression models are estimated for the transitional periphery and post-Soviet EU countries 
respectively. Model 1 in Table 4 shows regression results for the full sample. Both AGE and 
SIZE have positive and statistically significant impact on reinvestment for the full sample. In 
Models 2 and 3 however, we test impact of SIZE and AGE on reinvestment in transitional 
periphery and post-Soviet EU countries as subgroups. SIZE emerges as a significant factor for 
both subgroups while AGE emerges significant only for post-Soviet economies. For the 
second stage of the subgroup analysis to test H4b and H5b, we employ the Chow test for the 
statistical significance of difference in the regression coefficients between the subgroups of 
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countries in the sample. The F value for the Chow test FChowT  = 5.436 is significant (p<0.001; 
d.f. 9) which implies that the difference between the regression coefficients for these two 
groups is statistically significant
1
.   
  
In general AGE receives significant support in our linear regression analysis (Table 3). The 
age of operations in a host country is used as proxy for the level of business experience and 
embeddedness in a locale. We find that as an MNE is experienced in a locale, the likelihood 
of re-investment increases significantly. The subgroup regression model presented in Table 4 
(Model 2b) however, indicates that the impact of AGE on REINVESTMENT is more 
pronounced for core transitional economies compared to transitional periphery. Since the 
hypothesis does not expect significant difference between these two groups, there is a lack of 
support for H4b.  
 
Regarding the difference on the impact of SIZE on REINVESTMENT between core 
transitional and peripheral economies, there is a support for H5b as the size impact in both 
sub-groups are  very close (β = 0.680 p<0.001, and β = 605 p<0.001 indicating that any 
reinvestment difference between these two group of countries will be less pronounced as 
subsidiary size increases.  
 
Amongst sectoral controls, only TRADE (service industries) and CONSTRUCTION have 
negative, and statistically significant, coefficients which implies a lower propensity to re-
investment by MNEs in these industries. In terms of country of origin of MNEs, developed 
country MNE subsidiaries (i.e., subsidiaries of the US, UK, Canada or Japanese MNEs) are 
more likely to reinvest and expand the size of their operations. However, its coefficient in the 
                                                 
1
 We also applied the dummy variable method to validate the Chow test results which is not reported in this 
paper. 
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final model is not statistically significant. Regional control of transitional periphery has 
negative, and significant, coefficients in all of the models presented in Table 3. This indicates 
a lower propensity to reinvest in Transitional Periphery countries in comparison to EU 
member transitional countries.  
 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
We find that reinvestment rates are lower on the transitional periphery than in other post state 
socialist countries. But, what precisely, makes transitional peripheral countries less attractive? 
Our findings suggest relative perceptions of corruption are particularly severe deterrents to 
reinvestment in the transitional periphery, but not in the “core” post-state socialist transitional 
economies. It is likely that this reflects the greater institutional fluidity within such contexts, 
making for a more unpredictable business environment. In other words, bribery and 
corruption may be easier to cope with in climates where there is a greater predictability and 
continuity. These findings extend previous studies which have focused upon the deterrent 
effect of pervasive corruption upon FDI, but which looked at the initial investment decision 
only.  
 
It has been argued that the effects of corruption on investment will be more pronounced once 
firms have a greater understanding of the costs it poses (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). However, 
our results also show that, whilst age is statistically significant, older firms are more likely to 
reinvest. At first glance, this may appear counter-intuitive in light of the strength of the 
negative influence of pervasiveness. However, it may be that this actually reflects greater 
organisational embeddedness within local networks, which allows firms to link with each 
other, and with government and other players, and/or, greater experience and accumulated 
wisdom in dealing with a range of adverse contexts.  
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A robust court system is an important part of strong institutions (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003). Our data partially supports this argument and indicates that 
legal institutions are important for reinvestment, particularly an honest and uncorrupted 
judicial system. However, issues around contract enforcement, such as fairness and 
impartiality and the ability to enforce decisions, are not perceived as important by managers. 
To a degree, these findings resonate with the equally mixed evidence provided by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2005) in their analysis of legal constraints on firm growth. 
Equally, our findings with respect to enforcement may indicate the bargaining power that 
MNEs have by virtue of size and importance of FDI to the host. Nonetheless, this is an 
interesting finding which merits further research, given that previous work has suggested that 
higher levels of FDI inflows are associated with low cost contract dispute settlement 
environment (Alqhuist & Prakash, 2010).  
 
With respect to organizational size, our findings also support Bercovitz and Mitchell’s (2007) 
contention that scale is an important variable for long-term business survival in uncertain 
environments because of the organizational capital that it provides. Whilst their study 
integrated scale (using sales revenue) and scope, the focus of our study has allowed us to 
examine the relationship between reinvestment and size in endemically uncertain institutional 
environments more narrowly. They argue that to use sales and proxy for size, simply picks up 
profitability effects. We avoid this by utilising the number of employees as proxy. From a 
methods standpoint, our use of micro-data together with the actual experience of working 
MNE managers means that we avoid any distortionary effects arising from the use of 
perception-based indices (Aidt, 2009). Again, we find that size is a particularly important 
factor on the transitional periphery; quite simply, larger firms with greater resources at their 
disposal are better equipped to ride out environmental turbulence. 
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It could be the case that firms engaged in primary commodity sectors will be less sensitive to 
institutional weakness and fluidity than those in other sectors, owing to increasing resource 
scarcity and costs. However, we do not find that sector is a significant variable, other than in 
the case of the service and construction sectors. Construction is a bellweather industry, and 
more prone to the effects of any economic downturn. Furthermore, the proliferation of low 
cost Chinese competitors, which rely on their own imported labour, has made the 
international business environment more challenging. Again, service sector activities may 
require a greater engagement with a broad range of local players (labour, customers and 
suppliers) than in other sectors, where it may be possible to do lucrative business with a small 
socio-economic footprint. 
 
Contributions 
Our study has important implications for both policy and practice. From a policy perspective, 
reinvested earnings are an important part of maturing FDI stocks (Lundan, 2006). Through 
reinvestment MNEs grow their affiliates, thereby increasing their direct contribution to 
national growth and prosperity through tax revenue and employment. However, MNE 
reinvestment is also vital as part of growth, R&D and innovation processes, which although 
internally focused by the MNE, can have important spillover effects enhancing technological 
enhancement within the host country (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Eden, Levitas, & Martinez, 
1997; Meyer & Sinani, 2009; Ozawa, 2009). Host governments should seek to encourage 
reinvestment by incumbents as they represent less high risk than new FDI, and contribute to 
greater stability in FDI flows (Lundan, 2006, Mudambi, 1998). Our core finding is that 
institutional setting, and more specifically, relative institutional fluidity accentuates any 
adverse consequences of bribery and corruption on reinvestment choices, and that, host 
governments need to temper reform with the need for predictability. In other words, legal 
origins appear to be less important than how institutions work in practice; this highlights the 
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limitations in basing investment decisions on formal property rights, without due 
consideration as to how they are being implemented in practice.  
 
From a managerial perspective, our study suggests that managers should give careful 
consideration the degree and allocation of reinvestment funds in order to achieve optimal 
results. Managers need to explicitly recognise any trade-offs made between growth and 
innovation, and the security of that investment when they make reinvestment decisions. 
Furthermore, reinvesting into the business potentially provides added levels of financial slack 
which can be a critical factor in protecting a firm , and ensuring its survival, from the impact 
of environmental jolts (Bradley, et al., 2011). Larger and more experienced firms are better 
equipped to cope with environmental uncertainty; greater organisational resources and the 
accumulated knowledge and wisdom makes doing business in uncertain environments more 
easy. 
 
To date, many scholars have explored the question of how corruption affects FDI with 
multifarious results. We have contributed to the debate through our novel focus on an under-
researched aspect of FDI, namely, earnings reinvestment. Methodologically, we have 
explored this relationship within an integrated multi-level perspective. In this way, we have 
added to different bodies of empirical research, firstly; the small but growing body of 
empirical data which combines micro data across country and secondly; an emerging 
conceptual approach which fuses micro organisational factors with macro governance 
influences drawing on institutional theory. The breadth of the country of origin of the firm 
sample also merits highlighting as there is only limited  comparable work which has drawn 
upon a range of countries focused upon small businesses in emerging economies 
(Chhakravarty & Xiang, 2011). Other empirical work in this area focused upon post-
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communist countries (Johnson, et al., 2002) and Chinese firms in 2002 (Cull & Xu, 2005). 
Arguably these represent atypical phenomena of countries in transition, and as such it is not 
surprising that the security of property rights would be of high managerial concern. Our 
sample allows a more rounded picture to emerge in this respect as it draws upon data from 
both transitional-EU members, as well as transitional periphery. Our findings regarding the 
significant influence of pervasive corruption on reinvested earnings is novel but builds upon 
previous evidence on its influence on the initial MNE investment commitment. Our study 
indicates that there are further areas of the relationship between corruption and MNE 
reinvestment which warrant further investigation. This includes a deeper exploration of 
reinvestment over time and the nature of the link between reinvestment and resource 
allocation and innovation as well as further unpicking of the influence of contract 
enforcement.  
 
There are also limitations of the paper. Firstly, while the dataset used in this study is created 
by a professional organisation using a standard scale across nations, there are inherent 
limitations in such global surveys. However, our study provides some important pointers for 
the future and contributes to an emerging body of literature. Secondly, this paper focuses on 
two groupings of countries only, therefore a larger study including larger emerging countries 
would enhance existing body of literature. Thirdly, some of the scales used by the enterprise 
survey have a focus on only certain dimensions of quality of judicial institutions.   
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample 
Sample characteristics No % 
Broad country of origin of MNEs   
Developed Country MNEs 580 56.8 
Emerging Country MNEs 157 15.4 
Transitional Country MNEs 234 22.9 
Other (Mixed) 50 4.9 
Subsidiary size (number of employees)   
Small size (Less than 50) 481 47.1 
Medium size (50 to 249) 313 30.7. 
Large size (More than 250) 227 22.2 
Subsidiary age (years)   
Young firms (Less than 10) 512 50.2 
Middle age firms (10 to 19) 375 36.7 
Mature firms (More than 20) 134 13.1 
Ownership mode of subsidiary  
Joint venture 
 
566 
 
55.4 
Wholly owned subsidiary 455 44.6 
Industry of subsidiary   
Mining 16 1.5 
Construction 41 4.0 
Manufacturing 496 48.6 
Transport, storage and communication 70 6.9 
Wholesale and retail trade  249 24.5 
Real estate, renting and business services  82 8.0 
Hotels and restaurants  52 5.1 
Other services  15 1.4 
Host countries (Transitional Periphery)   
Albania 24 2.4 
Armenia 36 3.5 
Azerbaijan 51 5.0 
Belarus 42 4.1 
Bosnia 31 3.0 
Georgia 29 2.9 
Moldova 47 4.6 
Kazakhstan 54 5.3 
Kyrgyzstan 34 3.3 
Tajikistan 23 2.3 
Uzbekistan 46 4.5 
Other transitional periphery 131 12.9 
Host countries (Transitional EU members) 473 46.3 
Total 1021 100 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Variables 
Variable name Definition Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. REINVEST Log of reinvestment 1.59 0.70 1.00               
2. IMPARTIAL Impartial court system 0.32 0.46 0.18 1.00              
3. UNCORRUPT Uncorrupt court system 0.31 0.46 0.22* 0.59* 1.00             
4. ENFORCE Enforcing court decisions 0.41 0.49 0.15 0.45* 0.44* 1.00            
5. PERVASIVE Pervasiveness of corruption 2.42 1.46 -0.15 -0.19 -0.22* -0.08 1.00           
6. ARBITR Arbitrariness of corruption 0.73 0.44 -0.17* -0.23* -0.26* -0.21* 0.13 1.00          
7. TRANSPERI Transitional periphery location  1.74 0.71 -0.28* -0.16 -0.17* -0.07 0.16 0.11 1.00         
8. SIZE Log of subsidiary employees no 1.00 0.31 0.60* 0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.02 1.00        
9. AGE Log of subsidiary age 0.47 0.49 0.38* 0.03 0.12 0.03 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 0.32* 1.00       
10. DCMNE DCMNE parent 0.55 0.49 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.28* 0.06 -0.02 1.00      
11. EMNE ECMNE parent 0.14 0.35 -0.18* -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.28* -0.04 -0.06 -0.46* 1.00     
12. MANUFACT Manufacturing 0.46 0.49 0.29* 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.31 0.15 0.02 0.03 1.00    
13. TRADE Wholesale and retail. 0.25 0.43 -0.31* -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.54* 1.00   
14. CONSTR Construction 0.12 0.32 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.34* -0.21* 1.00  
15. HOSPTY Hospitality 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.21* -0.13 -0.08 1.00 
Notes: 
S.D. = Standard deviation 
*p<0.01 
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Table 3. Linear Regression Results (Dependent Variable: REINVEST) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variable name Definition β β β β β 
Host country level independent variables       
 IMPARTIAL Impartial court system  -0.03 (0.10)   -0.06 (0.08) 
 UNCORRUPT Uncorrupt court system  0.25** (0.10)   0.13**  (0.08) 
 ENFORCE Enforcing court decisions  0.10 (0.07)   0.02 (0.05) 
 PERVASIVE Pervasiveness of corruption  -0.04 (0.02)   -0.08** (0.04) 
ARBITR Arbitrariness of corruption  -0.13** (0.08)   -0.24** (0.12) 
Subsidiary-level independent variables       
SIZE Log of subsidiary employees no   0.22*** (0.01)  0.60*** (0.04) 
AGE Log of subsidiary age   0.29*** (0.07)  0.21** (0.09) 
Locational  Interaction       
PERVASIVE X TRANSPERI Pervasiveness X Transitional P    -0.09** (0.03) -0.06** (0.03) 
ARBITR X TRANSPERI Arbitrariness  X Transitional P    -0.08** (0.02) -0.05* (0.03) 
Location (country cluster)       
TRANSPERI Transitional periphery location  -0.33*** (0.06)   -0.56*** (0.12) -0.51*** (0.11) 
Parent-level controls       
DCMNE DCMNE parent 0.02  (0.07) 0.11 (0.07) 0.17** (0.05) 0.09 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) 
EMNE ECMNE parent -0.26** (0.10) -0.17 (0.11) -0.20** (0.08) -0.12 (0.11) -0.14* (0.08) 
Industry-level controls       
MANUFACT Manufacturing 0.16* (0.10) 0.27** (0.13) -0.05 (0.08) 0.14* (0.12) -0.08 (0.10) 
TRADE Wholesale and retail -0.42*** (0.11) -0.29** (0.14) -0.33** (0.08) -0.38** (0.13) -0.32** (0.11) 
CONSTR Construction -0.19 (0.12) -0.12 (0.14) -0.23** (0.09) -0.19 (0.14) -0.21* (0.11) 
HOSPTY Hospitality  0.18 (0.15) 0.17 (0.17) -0.09 (0.12) 0.09 (0.17) -0.08 (0.14) 
Intercept 1.80*** (0.11) 1.56*** (0.16) 0.51***(0.12) 1.95*** (0.13) 0.82** (0.20) 
F statistic 19.27*** 9.31*** 57.76*** 13.30*** 26.93*** 
Adjusted R-square 0.21 0.20 0.47 0.22 0.55 
Notes: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard errors in brackets
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Table 4: Results of Subgroup Regression Analysis for Size and Age of Operations (Dependent 
Variable: REINVEST) 
 
 
 
Variables                      Definition 
Model 1 
Full 
Sample     
Country Cluster 
Model 2a 
Transitional  
Periphery  
Model 2b  
Post Soviet 
Transitional EU 
Members 
 
Independent 
variables: Subsidiary 
level 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SIZE Log of subsidiary employees no 0.227***  0.680*** 0.605*** 
AGE Log of subsidiary age 0.298***  0.111 0.385*** 
Parent-level controls     
DCMNE DCMNE parent 0.174**  0.171** 0.020 
EMNE ECMNE parent -0.208** -0.116** 0.133 
Industry-level 
controls 
    
MANUFACT Manufacturing -0.050  -0.142 -0.029 
TRADE Wholesale and retail -0.333**  -0.296** -0.303** 
CONSTR Construction -0.232**  -0.231 -0.199* 
HOSPTY Hospitality  -0.091  -0.124 -0.030 
 Intercept 0.513*** 0.262 0.319** 
F value  57.76*** 24.69*** 38.49*** 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.472 0.490 0.556 
FChowT  value
†
   5.436*** 
Notes: 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01  
†
F value for Chow test can be defined as 








g
i
i
g
i
iPChowT gknRSSEkgRSSERSSEF
11
)()1()( , where RSSE 
stands for the residual sum of squared errors, n is the full sample p size, k is the number of estimated coefficients, and g is 
the number of subgroups. 
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Fig. 1: A Summary and direction of hypotheses 
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